




















Companies have the choice to deviate from their national corporate governance standards by opting into 
another system. They can do so via contractual devices – such as cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 
(re)incorporations, and cross-listings – which enable firms to choose their preferred level of investor 
protection and regulation. This paper reviews these three main contractual governance devices, their 
effect on value, and whether their adoption by firms induces a race to the bottom or a race to the top. 
Indeed, firms may opt for less shareholder-orientation or investor protection (shareholder-expropriation 
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1. Introduction 
 
Companies have the choice to deviate from their national corporate governance standards by (partially) 
opting into another system. They can do so via contractual devices – such as cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, (re)incorporations, and cross-listings – which enable firms to choose their preferred level of 
investor protection and regulation. This paper reviews these three main contractual corporate governance 
devices, their effect on value, and whether their adoption by firms induces a race to the bottom or a race 
to the top. Indeed, firms may opt for less shareholder-orientation or investor protection (shareholder-
expropriation hypothesis) rather than for more stringent rules that require firms to focus on shareholder 
value (bonding hypothesis).  
However, convergence via contractual corporate governance may only be an issue of marginal interest if 
a process of formal convergence of the various corporate governance systems is already under way. Let 
us first turn to the evidence on such convergence. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argue in their paper 
entitled ‘The end of history for corporate law’ that differences in ownership structures across countries 
do not necessitate differences in national corporate governance regulation. They claim that publicly held 
organizations are most effectively run when regulation assures that management act in the interest of 
shareholders and also prevents minority shareholder expropriation by large shareholders. To this respect, 
Hansmann and Kraakman believe that Anglo-American regulation and corporate governance are superior 
and  they  predict  a  global  convergence  of  corporate  governance  practices  towards  this  model.  They 
predict that companies that do not adopt a shareholder-oriented approach will be punished by the capital 
market  through  an  increased  cost  of  capital.  This  Darwinian  theory  predicts  that  only  one  form  of 
corporate governance will survive.  
Although there are many plausible arguments in favour of formal convergence, there seems to be some 
resistance to this survival of the fittest in practice. First, the differences in ownership and control between 
Anglo-American countries, Continental Europe and Japan are large and are relatively stable over time.  
Roe (1996) and Bebchuk and Roe (2002) argue that once a corporate governance system is in place, 
incumbent  interest  will  tend  to  preserve  that  system  unless  and  until  major  inefficiencies  or  other 
disruptions arise. Moreover, it will often be efficient not to incur switching costs. Given these continuing 
differences, the agency costs prevailing in various systems differ as well and these differences call for 
different structures and goals in corporate governance regulation. For example, the complementarity 
between control and legal systems is obvious in a country with strong ownership concentration: here, an 
important task of corporate law is to protect minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000) investigate the 
differences in investor  protection  and their  relation with control concentration  across  the  world  and 
attribute significant differences in capacities to protect outside investors to legal origin. Based on the   3 
rent-protection  theory
1,  Bebchuk  (1999).  Bebchuk  and  Roe  (2002),  Coffee  (1999),  and  Roe  (1996) 
explain  the  existence  of  (lasting)  differences  in  corporate  governance.  First,  different  ownership 
structures exist, because of the different private benefits of control that can be captured in different 
countries. Second, convergence of corporate governance regulation is limited because current regulation 
is path-dependent on the financial/legal history. Further, Gugler et al. (2004) predict that in addition full 
convergence of governance rules will never occur because of countries’ economic heritage. Bebchuk and 
Roe’s (1999) structure driven path dependency theory states that current ownership structures result from 
the initial ones which are moulded by the initial corporate legislation as well as the economical, political, 
social, and cultural environment. In other words, countries with different initial starting points arrive at 
different corporate ownership structures. If an organization has adopted a particular ownership structure, 
changing it would lead to organizational inefficiencies. For instance, such a change would affect the 
functioning of regulatory agencies and financial institutions. Another reason for hysteresis is network 
externalities: a firm’s most efficient ownership structure is affected by the ownership structure of other 
firms and the economic environment. Also, a change in the ownership structure may have significant 
impacts for some stakeholders. For instance, such a change may reduce the private benefits of certain 
stakeholders who may try to resist the change. There is also rule driven path dependency: the initial 
ownership structures influence the current ones through their effect on the evolution of corporate law. 
The first source of rule driven path dependency is economic efficiency. A country initially adopts laws 
and regulation designed to maximize efficiency given the ownership structures in place at the time. 
Another source of path dependency is the influence of interest groups. Bebchuck and Roe (1999) argue 
that the initial set of corporate rules is put in place by specific interest groups to serve their preferences. 
These  interest  groups  may  benefit  from  a  particular  ownership  structure  via  the  private  benefits  it 
generates. Roe (2003a) suggests another source which is politics. If a government is not supportive of 
e.g. diffuse ownership such a structure will not survive. Cultural differences across countries represent 
another source of path dependency as they may impede reform. Stulz and Williamson (2003) and Licht 
(2005)  investigate  the  effect  of  culture  on  corporate  law  and  the  corporate  governance system  of  a 
country. They conclude that there is a significant relation between a country’s culture, and shareholder 
voting rights and creditor rights. Roe (2003a, 2005a) argues that social norms are another source. Indeed, 
the social norms of a company are strongly aligned with the social norms of its country. For instance, 
managers in Europe tend to take into account the social welfare when making corporate decisions which 
implies less focus on shareholder value maximisation. This increases the managerial agency costs and 
leads to more concentrated ownership.  
                                                 
1 The rent-seeking or rent-protection theory explains why countries stick to a certain type of corporate 
governance regulation while this may still be economically inefficient. The reason is that specific types 
of  shareholders  can  extract  rents  (private  benefits)  from  firms  given  the  corporate  governance 
environment. Consequently, they will attempt to impede changes which may reduce their private benefits 
of control.    4 
While far-reaching convergence may be difficult to achieve, there has indeed been some convergence on 
specific issues across the two main corporate governance regimes: the Anglo-American and Continental 
European regimes. Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog (2005) show that the takeover regulation in 
Continental Europe has changed significantly over the past decade and has brought Continental Europe 
closer to the UK. For example, the use of voting caps and multiple voting rights (although non-voting 
shares can still be issued in most European countries) is no longer permitted. Goergen et al. conclude that 
there is a gradual convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model. Still, they point out that regulatory 
changes may have different outcomes in the different systems and that the evidence of convergence does 
not necessarily imply that the systems are converging towards a single corporate governance system.  
Wójick (2006) also shows evidence of governance convergence. He compares the corporate governance 
ratings (related to shareholder rights and duties of directors) for the largest European companies for 2000 
and 2003 and interprets the increase in the governance ratings across almost all his sample firms as 
evidence of a shift towards the US-system.
2 There are also several other drivers of corporate governance 
convergence such as the harmonization of listing requirements and financial accounting standards and 
practices. For example, the European Commission has decided that, as of 2005, all companies listed on a 
stock exchange in the EU need to comply with the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS).  
We conclude that some formal harmonization of corporate governance has arisen over the past 2 decades 
in terms of e.g. accounting rules, takeover regulation, listing requirements, investors protection. There are 
still strong differences not only between the main governance regimes (the Anglo-American system on 
the one hand, and the Continental European and Japanese one on the other) but also on the country level 
within each main system. Given the scepticism of many academics such as Gilson (2000) about strong 
formal convergence of governance regulation, we now turn to the role of the three main contractual 
corporate governance mechanism: cross-border takeovers, (re)incorporations and cross-listings.  
 
2. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
 
2.1. Changes in corporate governance through cross-border takeovers.  
The main hypothesis on cross-border M&As involving bidding firms with stronger investor protection 
than that of their targets is that such deals earn positive returns. This valuation effect is expected to be 
reflected in both the target and bidder announcement returns. In detail, international law prescribes that in 
a cross-border full acquisition, the target firm adopts the nationality of the acquirer (Bris and Cabolis, 
2008, and Bris et al. 2008). Hence, the target firm adopts the accounting standards, disclosure practices, 
                                                 
2 Cernat (2004) is more sceptical and believes that the Anglo-Saxon system is unlikely to work in Europe due to 
fundamental national differences. Moreover, the EU has failed to create a single European corporate governance 
system over the last 30 years. Bolton and Röell (2002) agree that European countries prefer their own set of 
governance rules and will therefore prevent the EU from pushing through one unified set of European corporate 
governance standards.   5 
and governance structures of the acquiring firm (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Martynova and Renneboog 
(2008a) expect the synergies created by such cross-border mergers to be an increasing function of the 
difference  in  the  quality  of  corporate  governance  between  the  bidder  and  the  target.  They  call  this 
phenomenon the positive spillover effect of corporate governance.  
The question then arises as to what may happen if the bidder offers worse investor protection than the 
target. From a legal point of view, the merged firm will end up with the bidder’s corporate governance. 
The  decrease  in  corporate  governance  quality  (the  negative  spillover  effect)  may  be  reflected  at  the 
takeover announcement in the returns to the bidder and the target. Martynova and Renneboog (2008a) 
also formulate an alternative hypothesis to the negative spillover hypothesis. A bidder from a country 
with  inferior  governance  standards  may  use  the  acquisition  to  bond  himself  to  the  stricter  investor 
protection  regulation  of  the  target.  If  this  bootstrapping  hypothesis  is  valid,  cross-border  takeovers 
initiated by bidders with poor investor protection may thus create governance-based synergies which will 
be  reflected  in  higher  announcement  returns  to  the  bidder  and  target.  So  what  are  the  factors  that 
determine the quality of corporate governance regulation? The literature proposes the following factors: 
shareholder  protection,  creditor  protection,  accounting  standards,  and  law  enforcement.  In  addition, 
Martynova  and  Renneboog  (2008a)  suggest  minority  shareholder  protection,  which  is  important  in 
countries where most companies have a large shareholder. Barca and Becht (2001) show that this is the 
case for most continental European countries.  
 
a) (Minority) shareholder protection 
The  degree  of  shareholder  protection  is  determined  not  only  by  the  corporate  law  applicable  to  the 
shareholders  of  a  company  (Bris  and  Cabolis,  2008)  or  by  the  codes  of  good  corporate  governance 
practice (so called soft law) enshrined in corporate law (e.g. legal requirement to comply-or-explain), but 
also by the listing requirements of the stock exchange where a firm is listed. As mentioned above, if the 
corporate governance standards of the bidder’s country are low, there may be a negative spillover effect. 
However, the bidder may use private contracting or bootstrapping to adopt the corporate governance 
practices of the target. In this context it is important to note that, while this bootstrapping/bonding is 
voluntary in a full cross-border acquisition, in case of a partial acquisition
3 the bidder has to honour the 
corporate  governance  rules  that  the  target  is  subject  to.  More  specifically,  according  to  the 
extraterritoriality  principle  in  international  law,  the  host  state  is  entitled  to  subject  a  foreign-owned 
subsidiary to its corporate law by reason of domicile of the subsidiary (Muchlinski, 1997). For instance, a 
French subsidiary which is not fully owned by its US parent is subject to French law. Thus, a partially 
acquired target is subject to the local corporate governance regulation and – in case it is listed – also to the 
local listing rules. From the bidder’s perspective, the minimum requirement is thus to comply with the 
                                                 
3 A partial acquisition consists of the bidder acquiring a stake of less than 100% in the target.   6 




b) Creditor rights 
Corporate governance spillovers may also affect creditors as they impact on the agency costs of debt. 
However, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that there are limitations to the functional spillover of creditor 
rights, because corporate assets remain under the jurisdiction of the country where they are physically 
located. In case of bankruptcy, this territoriality principle implies that each local court is in charge of the 
assets located in its jurisdiction and distributes them only to those creditors who present their claims 
(Felsenfeld, 2000). Conversely, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006) argue that it is not always the case that a 
firm’s assets remain under the jurisdiction of the country where these assets are located. As a result, the 
complexities of administering cross-border insolvencies led to the creation of the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency by the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 
1997. In order to reduce legal uncertainty, the Model Law puts a single jurisdiction in charge of the 
insolvency proceedings. The law aims at preventing firms from concealing assets or from transferring 
them to foreign jurisdictions and ensuring the fair treatment of all creditors. The main proceedings are 
held in the country where the firm’s centre of main interests is, and any concurrent proceedings are 
considered  secondary  proceedings.  The  Model  Law  proposes  a  modified  form  of  the  universality 
principle rather than that of territoriality.
5  
One possible effect of such jurisdictional co-operation is that it may encourage creditors to arbitrage their 
firm’s exposure to multiple jurisdictions. This phenomenon is known as jurisdiction (or forum) shopping 
(Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2006). If a firm becomes financially distressed, creditors may race against 
management and each other to find a creditor-friendly jurisdiction to strengthen their legal position and to 
obtain maximum satisfaction for their claims. Cross-border M&As can clearly increase the scope for 
jurisdiction shopping, thereby further enhancing creditor protection spillovers.
6 How jurisdictional co-
operation can encourage jurisdiction shopping is best demonstrated by the framework adopted by the 
                                                 
4 In some cases, it not clear which firm is the acquirer and which one is the target. Bris and Cabolis (2007) provide such 
examples. For instance, German incorporation is likely to be chosen in a cross-border takeover transaction involving a German 
firm as the transfer of control of a German company to a foreign firm is prohibited by law. As a result, the foreign bidder has to 
create a German corporate shell. Tax issues may also be of great importance as the exchange of shares triggers different tax 
liabilities across countries. Consequently, in some M&As the largest party is not the surviving entity as its country has the less 
attractive tax regime.  
5 The Model Law is based on previous international agreements on cross-border insolvency, including the Nordic Bankruptcy 
Convention of 1933, the Montevideo and Bustamente Conventions in force in much of South America and the Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings of the European Union (which became the European Insolvency Regulation of 2000). The US did not 
have such a formal agreement in place until 2005 when it included the Model Law into its bankruptcy code as Chapter 15. 
However, the US had already applied a modified form of universality, such that it claimed worldwide jurisdiction over firms 
incorporated in the US, but was also prepared to co-operate with and possibly recognize the rulings of concurrent proceedings 
abroad to prevent the unequal treatment of foreign creditors (Lechner, 2002). 
6 Forum shopping by creditors is a well-known phenomenon even within the US and explains the popularity of the specialized 
bankruptcy courts of Delaware and New York. While the US bankruptcy code is federal, state courts enjoy considerable judicial 
discretion and protect creditor interests to varying degrees. Firms sometimes file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy pre-emptively to give 
them leverage against creditors. If they do not file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, creditors can file for insolvency against the firm in 
any state in which it has an insolvent affiliate (Bank for International Settlements, 2002).   7 
European Union (EU). By implementing the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) in 2000, the EU 
introduced what is the broadest and most effective international agreement on cross-border insolvencies. 
The EIR identifies the main proceedings based on the insolvent firm’s centre of main interests, but also 
allows creditors, wherever their domicile in the EU, to initiate secondary proceedings in any member state 
where the firm has an establishment. This rule clearly facilitates insolvency arbitrage. For example, it 
allows French creditors to enforce their claims in the UK, even if the firm’s centre of main interests is in a 
third country (Davydenko and Franks, 2006).
7  
To conclude, bondholders may benefit more substantially from those cross-border M&As which expose 
their firm to a jurisdiction with better creditor protection. New or increased exposure to a more creditor-
friendly  jurisdiction  should  increase  pressure  on  management  to  reduce  the  probability  of  financial 
distress by avoiding excessive risk-taking. This pressure can only be enhanced if opportunities exist for 
insolvency arbitrage, because a diligent or astute creditor should always have the incentive to exploit 
disparate priority rules and other differences in creditor protection. 
 
c) Accounting standards 
The quality of the accounting standards is also an important factor determining shareholder protection. 
The accounting standards applying to the newly merged firm are by default those of the country of the 
acquiring firm. Firms can exceptionally alter that situation via contractual arrangements. Indeed, merging 
entities sometimes opt for the accounting standards of a third country or region, the most common choices 
being US GAAP and IFRS.  
 
d) Law enforcement 
The lack of law enforcement and the level of corruption in a country have a significant influence on 
(foreign) investments as they distort the economic and financial environment and reduce the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability. La Porta et al. (1998) define corruption as the bribes connected with import and export licences, 
exchange  controls,  tax  assessment,  policy  protection,  and  loans.  Clearly,  a  firm  with  international 
operations is influenced by the corrupt practices in the countries where it operates, pays taxes, and where 
its creditors are located (Bris and Cabolis, 2008). Corruption is inherent to the country where the firm’s 
real activities take place and not necessary the country where the firm is either domiciled or incorporated. 
It follows that cross-border M&As are subject to the levels of corruption prevailing in the countries of 
                                                 
7 In France, insolvency proceedings are administered by the courts that strive to maintain the firm as a going concern. Even 
secured creditors have little confidence in recovering their debts, because their claims are subordinated to government and 
employee claims, and they can neither seize the collateral nor control the timing and method of collateral realization. In contrast, 
creditors in the UK have extensive powers in seizing the collateral and have strong incentives to race against management and 
each other. In fact, a creditor with a floating charge can sell the entire firm and its assets without taking into account the interests 
of other claimants. Finally, even creditors with unsecured claims have some liquidation rights.   8 
both  the  bidder  and  the  target.  When  making  a  takeover  decision,  the  acquiring  firm  may  have  to 
familiarize  itself  with the  system  of  political  relations  and  the  local  administration  prevailing  in  the 
country where the target firm operates. Similarly, target firms may become subject to the corrupt system 
of the acquirer’s country after the takeover. Evidence in the literature suggests that the level of law 
enforcement in the host country affects foreign investors.  
 
2.2 Empirical evidence 
This  section  reviews  the  empirical  literature  on  the  impact  of  differences  in  corporate  governance 
regulation on bidder and target performance and value in cross-border takeovers. Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
investigate whether cross-border mergers and acquisitions are a means enabling a company to opt into 
another governance system. They base themselves on La Porta et al. (1997, 1999, 2000, 2002) who have 
shown that differences in investor protection affect the firm’s ability to raise external funds through 
differences in the rate of return required by investors. In particular, Rossi and Volpin (2004) hypothesize 
that the cost of capital decreases when a target is acquired by a bidder with better investor protection. 
Hence, it makes sense for targets with poor investor protection to be taken over by bidders with higher 
better protection. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that, compared to the bidders, targets tend to be located in 
countries where shareholder protection is less tightly regulated and enforced. Consequently, cross-border 
M&As  enhance  convergence  towards  stronger  investor  protection.  In  addition,  better  shareholder 
protection induced by cross-border mergers translates into a higher value for the whole industry to which 
the target belongs. Rossi and Volpin (2004) conclude that stronger shareholder protection in the bidder’s 
country has a positive impact on takeover volume, on bid premiums, on the number of hostile cross-
border takeovers and on the number of takeovers of poorly-governed targets by well-governed bidders. In 
addition, better bidder protection enables bidders to make more frequently all-equity offers.
    
Bris et al. (2008) adopt an industry perspective in their analysis of the impact of changes in national 
corporate governance systems through takeovers. They predict that a cross-border acquisition of a target 
with poor corporate governance by a better-governed bidder has a positive impact on the value of the 
whole industry (as measured by Tobin’s q).
8 They confirm that most acquisitions are made by companies 
from countries with better creditor protection, higher accounting standards, and less corruption. Bris and 
Cabolis  find  that  the  Tobin’s  q  of  the  target’s  industry  is  positively  related  to  an  improvement  in 
shareholder protection, a decrease in creditor protection, better accounting standards, and lower levels of 
corruption. In addition, the authors find weak evidence that the Tobin’s q of the acquirer’s industry 
increases when the target is from a country with stronger investor protection. They argue that, even 
though acquirers are not required to adopt the corporate governance practices of the target, this result 
suggests  that  in  practice  acquirers  do  so.  To  conclude,  Bris  and  Cabolis  (2008)  show  that  there  is 
significant evidence of contractual convergence of corporate governance via cross-border M&As.  
                                                 
8 The quality of the corporate governance system is measured in terms of its shareholder protection, creditor protection, 
accounting standards, and the level of law enforcement.   9 
In contrast to Bris and Cabolis (2008), Kuipers et al. (2003) focus on the firm level. They test their agency 
cost contracting hypothesis which states that companies from countries with strong investor protection act 
in the interest of their shareholders and hence only undertake profitable acquisitions. In contrast, their 
contractual convergence hypothesis predicts that companies from countries with weak investor protection 
acquire firms with better protection (these are US companies in the Kuipers et al. study) with the aim of 
bonding themselves to the better investor protection. Kuipers et al. (2003) conclude that the level of 
shareholder protection in the bidder’s country is positively related to the target’s expected performance 
(the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)). The authors conclude that their findings are mostly in line 
with the agency cost contracting hypothesis.  
Starks and Wei (2005) also assume that the direction of the corporate governance spillover is from the 
bidder to the target. However, they expect that the premium paid to the target shareholders decreases with 
the quality of the corporate governance system of the bidder’s country: if the target is acquired by a 
bidder from a country with weaker corporate governance, the target shareholders will demand a higher 
premium in order to compensate them for the increased risk exposure. The authors focus on all-equity 
cross-border acquisitions as they make the bidder’s risk profile relevant to the target shareholders. Starks 
and  Wei  explain  the  fact  that  US  targets  earn  significant  abnormal  returns  at  the  announcement  of 
takeovers  by  bidders  from  countries  with  weak  corporate  governance  by  the  need  for  the  target 
shareholders to be compensated for the decrease in investor protection.  
Consistent with Bris et al. (2008) and Rossi and Volpin (2004), Martynova and Renneboog (2008a) find 
that  bidders  more  frequently  score  higher  than  the  targets  on  various  corporate  governance  indices. 
Whereas they find support for the positive spillover effect, they do not find support for the negative 
spillover hypothesis. As mentioned above, the alternative hypothesis to the negative spillover hypothesis, 
the bootstrapping or bonding hypothesis (Doidge et al., 2008) states that acquirers with weak corporate 
governance use the acquisition as a device to bond themselves to the stricter investor protection of the 
target. The bidder’s shareholders will then benefit from the increased investor protection via the positive 
valuation effect. When the bidder comes from a country with weaker corporate governance standards, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) show that both the bidder and the target returns are higher lower. 
While this result is in contradiction with the negative spillover hypothesis, it may still be compatible with 
the bootstrapping hypothesis: it seems that bidders bootstrap to the better governance regime of the target 
and experience a share price increase. Importantly, the bootstrapping effect is mainly observed for partial 
acquisitions. This makes sense as these acquisitions which still involve some of the target shareholders 
(i.e. those who did not sell out) after the deal and the target firm remaining listed on its home country’s 
stock exchange. In other words, these are the deals where   the target remains as a separate entity with 
strict governance standards which the bidder is obliged to follow.  
Bris and Cabolis (2007) study the acquisition of France’s Rhône-Poulenc by Germany’s Hoechst. In 
1999, Hoechst acquired Rhône-Poulenc for EUR 17bn in an all-equity bid. The merger, which resulted in 
the creation of Aventis, is particularly interesting because the two firms are from countries with different   10 
legal origins and hence different corporate governance systems. Furthermore, both firms were cross-listed 
in the US. While the corporate governance structures of the French and the German firm were very 
different, the merged firm adopted governance structures (e.g. the board structure and voting procedures) 
from both Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc. The shareholders of Aventis ended up being better protected 
against managerial expropriation than they were under the French system.  
Whereas investor protection can be transferred across countries, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that this is 
not the case for creditor protection as the target firm’s assets remain under the jurisdiction of the country 
of the firm’s physical location. Accordingly, Bris et al. (2008) do not find a significant relationship 
between improvements in creditor protection and industry value (measured by the industry’s Tobin’s q). 
In  contrast,  Renneboog  and  Szilagyi  (2006)  find  creditor  protection  spillover  effects  when  they 
investigate the impact  of changes in  creditor  protection  on  bondholder  returns. They  examine deals 
involving European bidders with Eurobonds outstanding and show that the legal protection of creditors is 
a strong predictor of bond performance. This result suggests that cross-border deals provide much greater 
scope for the functional spillover of creditor protection than is assumed by La Porta et al. (2000). This 
spillover effect is intensified by the ability of creditors to arbitrage across legal systems, and ultimately 
reduce what are the agency costs of debt.  
Finally,  according  to  Bris  et  al.  (2008),  adopting  stricter  accounting  standards  through  cross-border 
takeovers is associated with a significant increase in industry value (industry Tobin’s q). The value of the 
bidder’s industry also increases if the target country is relatively less corrupt. However, the Tobin’s q of 
the target industry is not affected by the degree of corruption in the bidder’s country.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The empirical evidence on the impact of differences in corporate governance quality on the returns earned 
in cross-border acquisitions are summarised in Table 1. There is broad consensus in the literature that: (i) 
companies from countries with weak corporate governance standards are considered attractive takeover 
targets; (ii) targets with better shareholder protection require a higher takeover premium which reflects 
the increased risk resulting from a reduction in shareholder protection and (iii) targets benefit from an 
acquisition by a bidder with better corporate governance, while bidders lose value when they acquire a 




There are two principles on what law applies to incorporations. According to the ‘real seat principle’, the 
relevant law is the law of the location of the company’s headquarters or main activities. Conversely, the 
‘incorporation principle’ implies that the relevant law is the law of the country of incorporation. More   11 
specifically,  under  the  former  principle,  firms  must  apply  the  corporate  law  of  their  real  seat’s 
geographical location, whereas the latter principle allows firms to choose freely the legislation that they 
wish to comply with. Companies from countries applying the real seat principle cannot reincoporate in 
another country as the main place of real activity and corporate law must coincide (Becht, Mayer, and 
Wagner,  2008).  Most  Continental  European  countries  follow  the  real  seat  principle,  while  the 
incorporation  principle  has  been  adopted  by  the  UK,  Ireland,  and  the  US.  Until  recently,  only  US 
corporations have been able to choose or change their state of incorporation, as in Europe many barriers 
were in place restricting corporate mobility. However, after a radical change in EU law following a series 
of recent rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), cross-border mobility via incorporations, but 
not via reincorporations, is now possible within the EU (Becht et al., 2006).  
A variety of motives have been advanced and explored in order to explain why companies may want to 
reincorporate (Cumming and MaIntosh, 2002). They are: (1) the setting up of takeover defences, (2) the 
reduction in directors’ liability, (3) the move to a jurisdiction with more flexible corporate laws, (4) 
savings on tax or franchise fees, (5) the reconciliation of the legal and operating domicile of the firm, (6) 
and the facilitation of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Among these six motives, the adoption of 
takeover defences and the limitation of directors’ liability have proved to be the most popular ones 
driving reincorporation proposals (Heron and Lewellen, 1998). 
The economic analysis of freedom of (re)incorporation raises two closely related issues: the impact of 
inter-jurisdictional competition for corporate charters on corporate law and the effect of jurisdiction 
shopping for corporate charters on firm value (Becht et al., 2008). When corporations are free to choose 
their regulatory regime, they will opt for jurisdictions that deliver the most desirable legal services at the 
lowest  costs.  Consequently,  competition  between  jurisdictions  may  occur  to  attract  and  retain 
incorporations.  This  inter-jurisdictional  competition  for  corporate  charters  is  expected  to  play  a 
significant role in shaping corporate law and governance across countries, and in turn the value of a firm. 
According  to  one  school of thought, the  intensified  competition  between  legal  regimes  leads to the 
design of high quality corporate law that promotes economic efficiency (see e.g. Winter, 1977; Romano, 
1985). Corporations will end up establishing their legal seat in a jurisdiction where the legal services are 
provided at the lowest cost and priced most properly in relation to their needs (Fluck and Mayer, 2005). 
This is often called the cost-avoidance hypothesis. Legal competition may thus lead to a ‘race to the top’. 
The  alternative  view  is  more  sceptical  with  respect  to  the  incentives  provided  by  jurisdictional 
competition. In particular, regulators may respond by endorsing laws that cater for managerial rather 
than investor interests in order to increase the potential revenues from incorporation (the shareholder-
exploitation hypothesis). The resulting ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of standards of legal protection is 
likely to harm economic efficiency (Cary, 1974).   12 
Both in the EU and the US, corporate governance laws are enacted at the state level.
9 Accordingly, there 
is significant variation across states in terms of the choices offered to individual companies and in terms 
of the obligations and duties imposed on them. For instance, some jurisdictions protect firms against the 
threat of a takeover whereas others limit the use of takeover defences. The differences are especially 
noticeable within the EU given the wide cultural and institutional variations across its member states.  
 
3.1 Inter-jurisdictional competition in the US 
Each of the fifty US states maintains its own court system and enacts its own set of corporate rules and 
procedures  for  resolving  disputes  that  may  arise  within  corporations.  The  law  of  the  state  of 
incorporation governs the internal affairs of a firm, e.g. with respect to whether shareholders are entitled 
to vote on a particular matter. Generally speaking, the location of incorporation is irrelevant to how 
firms’  operations  are  going  to  be  taxed  or  regulated  (Greenwood,  2005).  Hence,  according  to  the 
conventional view, the incorporation choice is a pure choice of legal regime (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003). 
If the decision to incorporate in a particular jurisdiction can be characterized as a ‘purchase of a legal 
regime’, then each state can be characterized as competing for incorporations (Ferris et al., 2004).
10 
However,  recent  evidence  indicates  that  in  the  United  States,  only  Delaware  actively  competes  for 
incorporations:  firms decide either to stay where they “grew up” or reincorporate to Delaware. They do 
not choose between Delaware and a third state. 
The theory on the race to the top in the market for corporate law assumes that the board of directors 
selects the particular law and governance regulation that maximizes firm value (Winter, 1977; Daines, 
2001). Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk (2006) do not agree with this race to the top argument. They 
argue that the market for corporate law is only capable of performing well with respect to rules that are 
not related to private benefits of control. When dealing with rules that affect private benefits or when a 
conflict of interest arises, competition drives states to offer legal rules favourable to managers but not to 
shareholders.  Self-interested  managers  tend  to  opt  for  lax  corporate  laws  that  increase  their  private 
benefits  at  the  shareholders’  expense.  Consequently,  states  may  openly  compete  for  incorporation 
                                                 
9 An interesting aspect of corporate law in the US is the competitive federalism. US corporate law is regulated and enforced via 
two parallel systems. The federal government and the state authorities are both involved in the corporate lawmaking. This makes 
the competition between the states more complicated, as the states do not only compete amongst each other, but they also subject 
to federal interventions (Roe, 2003b, 2005b). In particular, Becht, Jenkinson, and Mayer (2005) state that corporate lawmaking 
in the US does not just reflect horizontal competition between states but also a three-way interplay between states mindful of 
each other and the federal government. The federal government intervenes whenever it believes that the state legislation falls 
short in certain areas: regulatory responses to corporate governance failures tend to be initiated at the federal level. Examples of 
federal government intervention through legislation include the Securities Act of 1933, the Williams Act of 1968 (takeovers), 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 
10 Only Delaware has been successful in attracting (re)incorporations (Kahan and Kamer, 2001). Daines (2001) states that US 
firms essentially face a single choice and not fifty alternatives: they incorporate either in their home jurisdiction or in Delaware. 
The market for corporate charters is thus characterized by a bimodal pattern: 95% of all firms that seek legal rules outside the 
state of their headquarters end up in Delaware. Therefore, Daines argues that the concept of a nationwide market in legal rules 
may be misleading. Delaware’s success in the corporate charter market is explained by two institutional factors, namely high 
franchise fees and a specialized court. Its special court, the Court of Chancery, deals exclusively with corporate legal cases. 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery, its unique administrative and legal expertise in corporate law and its efficiency in providing legal 
services to companies have encouraged companies to opt for its legislation.  
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business by serving managerial preferences with respect to an important set of corporate issues, leading 
to a race to the bottom (see e.g. Cary, 1974; Bebchuk, 1992; Bebchuk and Ferrell, 1999 and 2002). 
Ferris, Lawless and Noronha (2004) find that US firms are sensitive to the differences in corporate laws 
across  states.  They  observe  that  managers  make  the  decisions  as  to  the  location  of  their  firm’s 
headquarters and the location of its incorporation based on the degree of discretion they will be given in 
each location.  
In turn, Cary’s (1974) argument about the race to the bottom has been criticised and challenged by other 
scholars (see e.g. Winter, 1977; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991, Romano, 1985, 1993, 1998) who claim 
that  jurisdiction  shopping  is  an  indispensable  part  of  the  competition  dynamics  and  not  necessarily 
unfavourable to shareholders. Dodd and Leftwich (1980), Romano (1985), Peterson (1988), Netter and 
Poulsen  (1989)  show  that  firms  incorporated  in  Delaware  have  higher  share  prices  on  average  and 
generate positive abnormal returns.
11 Most of this literature hence supports the cost-avoidance hypothesis 
of  (re)incorporations  and  refutes  the  shareholder-exploitation  thesis  (see  Table  2).  Daines  (2001) 
provides further support for the cost-avoidance hypothesis as he finds that that a Delaware incorporation 
leads  to  a  higher  Tobin’s  Q  after  controlling  for  size,  industry,  growth  opportunities  and  financial 
performance.  He  also  reports  that  the  higher  probability  of  being  taken  over  that  comes  with  an 
incorporation  in  Delaware  suggests  that  Delaware’s  law  facilitates  takeovers  and  thus  enhances 
shareholder value. The validity of the race to the top argument is questioned by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2002), Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and Subramanian (2004) who contend that the findings on 
higher shareholder values for Delaware firms do no longer hold after 1996 (see Table 3).  
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) argue that allowing firms to adopt anti-takeover statutes helps states to retain 
their own firms and to attract incorporations from out-of-state firms. Heron and Lewellen (1998) show 
that  firms  often  reincorporate  in  order  to  set  up  takeover  defences  (e.g.  poison  pills),  even  to  the 
detriment of their existing shareholders. This view is supported by the overwhelming majority of event 
studies on the effects of anti-takeover devices which find that the adoption of such devices destroys 
shareholder wealth (see e.g. Bhagat and Brickley, 1984; Malatesta and Walking, 1988; Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1990). For this reason, the UK City Code on Takeovers discourages any type of defensive 
tactics and instead promotes takeover bids (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Fluck and Mayer, 2006). For 
example, the Code does not permit firms to introduce poison pills once they have become subject to a 
takeover bid.  
Advocates of state competition in the US argue that anti-takeover statutes are perverse because they do 
not serve shareholders’ interests (see e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Romano, 1993). Consistent 
with this view, Karpoff and Malatesta (1989 and 1995) and Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992) find that 
                                                 
11 Conversely, Heron and Lewellen (1998) find insignificant abnormal returns.    14 
firms incorporated in states with strong anti-takeover legislation suffer statistically significant stock price 
declines. Furthermore, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998 and 1999) find evidence indicating that the 
adoption of anti-takeover statutes increases agency costs. They observe increased extraction of rents 
through  executive  compensation  and  reduced  managerial  incentives.  Indeed,  the  adoption  of  anti-
takeover statutes is seen as an adverse outcome of state competition, whereby excessive protection is 
provided  to  increase  managerial  private  benefits  rather  than  shareholder  wealth  (Bebchuk,  1992; 
Bebchuk and Ferrell, 1999; Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk, 2006).  
Based  on  the  argument  that  state  anti-takeover  statutes  harm  shareholders,  state  competition  may 
discourage such practices. However, this prediction is not supported by the empirical evidence: Bebchuk 
and Cohen (2003) show that states with no anti-takeover statutes are not very good at attracting and 
retaining incorporations, while states that allow strong anti-takeover statutes are the most successful in 
the (re)incorporation market. In contrast, Romano (2001) does not believe that increased anti-takeover 
protection is an important reason to reincorporate: Delaware has adopted fewer and milder anti-takeover 
statutes than Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts but still remains the most successful state in luring 
incorporations. Moreover, Delaware has developed an extensive body of case law on takeovers, which 
questions the legal standing of the adoption of some anti-takeover statutes. Table 4 summarizes the 
results from Subramaniam (2001) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) who disagree with Romano. The 
former find that, when there are strong anti-takeover defences in the headquarters state, there is less 
reason to (re)incorporate in Delaware or another state. In general, anti-takeover protections improve a 
state’s competitive position in the corporate charter market by enhancing both its ability to retain local 
firms and attract incorporations from other states. These findings provide further support for the race to 
the  bottom  hypothesis  as  competition  provides  states  with  strong  incentives  to  adopt  anti-takeover 
statutes that do not serve shareholders. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
3.2.  American federalism 
Roe (2003b, 2005b) has recently challenged the idea that the “race” whether to the top or the bottom, is 
so central to mechanics of making American corporate law it has been thought to be.  If the issues are 
truly central to the American economy -strong enough to seriously affect capital costs or sufficiently 
scandalous  to  attract  media  attention-  then  the  issue  frequently  moves  to  the  federal  agenda,  for 
Congress, the SEC, or the federal courts to handle.  He argues (or observes) that the United States has 
two  parallel  makers  of  corporate law,  one  at  the  state-level  (primarily  in  Delaware)  and another  in 
Washington.  Securities rules deeply affect corporate governance and the allocation of authority between 
managers and shareholders.  When a deep problem arises (such as the Enron and WorldCom scandals), 
there’s a reaction in Washington, not a race among states.  Sarbanes-Oxley is the latest reaction, but not 
the first:  the securities laws are examples, as are their frequent and substantial amendments; the proxy 
rules of the 1950s (managed by the SEC) are another example; the Williams Act on takeovers and federal   15 
takeover  judicial  actions  are  another;  the  expansion  of  fiduciary  duties  via  the  broad  anti-fraud 
interpretations  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s  (and  their  subsequent  contraction)  are  yet  another.  
Moreover,  Delaware  players  are  exquisitely  aware  that  if  they  act  badly,  the  issue  will  move  to 
Washington, pushed their by federal regulators, offended interest groups, or American public opinion. 
 
3.3 Increasing cross-border incorporation mobility in the EU 
The EU law on incorporations has its origin in Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome: companies incorporated 
in  one  member  state  of the  EU  have the right to operate  in  any  other  member state.  Although  the 
principle of freedom of incorporation was laid down in the founding treaties of the EU, it was only 
applied in the UK and Ireland as all other EU member states had adopted the real seat doctrine. Basically, 
firms in the latter countries were required to be incorporated where they operated. In recent years, radical 
changes in EU company law have taken place via a series of rulings by the ECJ. The Centros (1999), 
Überseering  (2002)  and  Inspired  Art  (2003)  rulings
12  have  reaffirmed  the  principle  of  freedom  of 
establishment within the EU and opened up the EU to cross-border incorporation mobility. According to 
Becht, Mayer, and Wagner (2008), these rulings constitute one of the strongest attempts to deregulate 
company law in Europe and provide a natural experiment on the impact of regulation on corporate 
mobility. Some legal scholars expect a migration of companies from other EU countries to the UK and 
the export of UK corporate laws to other countries. The UK is the preferred country of incorporation 
because it has the simplest incorporation procedures, the most liberal corporate laws, and the lowest 
incorporation  costs  in  the  EU.  Becht  et  al.  (2008)  analyse  the  effects  of  deregulation  on  corporate 
mobility within Europe by using data on 2.14 million newly incorporated UK firms: they show that the 
ECJ rulings have had a striking impact on the legal geography of new company formations. In particular, 
they observe a significant increase in the number of companies from all EU member states incorporating 
in the UK during the period 2002-2005: the number of new private limited companies from all other EU 




A cross-listing consists of a firm listing on a foreign stock exchange at the time of its initial public 
offering (IPO) on its domestic market or thereafter.
14 Cross listing on a market with better corporate 
governance regulation is one way for a firm to improve its own corporate governance. According to 
Coffee  (2002),  firms  from  weak  legal regimes  cross  list  on the  US  market,  a  market  with superior 
                                                 
12 See ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd and Erhvervs-og Selbskabsstyrelsen (1999) ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00 Überseering 
BV and Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement (NCC) (2002) ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en 
Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd (2003) ECR I-10155.
 
13 Corporate mobility in the EU only applies to private limited companies, which are mostly small firms managed by only one or 
two owner-directors. The shareholder-manager conflict at the basis of the US reincorporation debate hence does not apply to the 
EU. Moreover, in contrast to the US law on corporate mobility, reincorporation or change in legal status of existing firms is still 
not permitted  by EU law.  
14 Conversely, a foreign listing consists of a firm, which is not yet listed on its home market, listing on a foreign market.   16 
corporate governance regulation, in order to commit themselves not to expropriate their shareholders. 
This is the so called bonding hypothesis. In particular, Coffee (1999) argues that a US cross-listing 
makes it harder and more expensive for the controlling shareholders and managers to extract private 
benefits and to expropriate the minority shareholders. Formal disclosure rules and securities laws ensure 
that investors and analysts receive sufficient information, which in turn allows capital market forces to 
discipline  controlling  insiders  in  case  of  expropriation  (Leuz,  2006).  According  to  the  bonding 
hypothesis, cross-listing creates value for firms as shares of cross-listed firms are traded at a premium 
relative to other firms (King and Segal, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Smith, 2005). 
Virtually all of the finance literature on cross-listings is concerned with the listing of a foreign company 
on a US stock exchange (and to a much lesser extend on the LSE). A foreign company can choose to 
cross-list its shares on a US exchange in two ways. It can either list its shares directly or indirectly via 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). An ADR is an instrument issued by an American commercial 
bank acting as a depositor. The ADR represents a fraction or a multiple of one or more shares of the 
foreign stock (Ayyagari, 2004). The advantages of ADRs for US investors include lower transaction 
costs,
15 prices and dividends being settled in USD, and the US depositary bank providing statements to 
the investors. In 1990, 352 companies from 24 different countries were cross-listed in the US. In 1999, 
this number had grown to 1,800 companies from 78 different countries (Coffee, 2002). To date, about 
20% of the common stock listed on the NYSE are (cross)-listings of foreign companies (Li, 2007). 
There are four different types of ADRs. A Rule 144a private offering consists of a listing on PORTAL, a 
privately  owned  electronic  market  where  only  qualified  institutional  buyers  (QIBs)  can  trade.  This 
market is not regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). A Level I ADR is the listing with 
the least stringent requirements, resulting in a firm’s ADRs trading on the US over-the-counter market 
(OTC).  The  firm  does  not  need  to  comply  with  US  GAAP  or  full  SEC  disclosure  requirements. 
Conversely, a Level II ADR requires the issuing company to comply with US accounting and disclosure 
standards. However, only existing shares can be listed and no new capital can be raised. Finally, a Level 
III ADR combines a listing with the issue of new capital on the US market. Apart from the firm having to 
comply with the disclosure standards as per the Level II requirements, it also has to publish a prospectus 
and meet additional disclosure requirements.  
In summary, a company choosing to cross-list via a Rule 144a private offering or a Level I ADR does 
not subject itself to major changes in terms of its corporate governance. The company is not required to 
comply with any of the accounting and disclosure requirements of the SEC. In contrast, Levels II and III 
ADRs similar to a full listing on a US stock exchange. As a result, the company has to follow the US 
listing requirements and US corporate governance regulation. Hence, Levels II and III tend to cause a 
major change in the company’s corporate governance.  
                                                 
15 Based on an estimation made by the Bank of New York, an ADR investment can save an investor 10-40 basis points annually 
when compared to the costs of trading and holding ordinary shares outside the US (Smith, 2005).   17 
However, there are still some non-trivial differences between a cross-listing in the US and a US domestic 
listing (Ayyagari, 2004). For example, many countries recognize the depositary bank as the shareholder 
of the securities underlying the ADR programme, but not the ADR holders themselves. Foreign issuers 
are also not subject to the proxy rules of the SEC. Another important difference is that some depository 
agreements  limit  the  voting  rights  of  the  ADR  holders  by  restricting  them  to  vote  only  on  some 
predetermined  issues.  This  limits  the  ability  of  the  holders  to  defend  themselves  against  possible 
expropriation by corporate insiders. In some cases, foreign issuers are even allowed to have internal 
rather than external auditors.  
A number of foreign issuers have bypassed the ADR system altogether through a direct cross-listing in 
the US. By issuing so-called global registered shares (GRS),
16 firms can have their shares traded on both 
the US market and their home market. Smith (2005) explains that the growth in the number of GRS 
issued and traded is driven by improvements in international clearing and settlement systems, which have 
reduced the need of US depository banks as intermediaries. Further, the close relationship between the 
US and Canadian securities clearing and settlement systems explains why Canadian companies have 
historically directly listed their shares on the US exchanges. According to Smith, the US system is also 
linked with both the German and Swiss clearing systems and the links between the US and other clearing 
systems are being developed. 
Table 5 provides a summary of empirical studies which have attempted to test the validity of the bonding 
hypothesis.  For  example,  Reese  and  Weisbach  (2002)  focus  on  the  relationship  between  minority 
shareholder protection and cross-listings by foreign firms in the US. They argue that it is often difficult 
for companies to raise capital in countries with weak investor protection. These companies may therefore 
choose to cross-list their shares on a stock exchange with better investor protection. By doing so, they 
signal  to  the  market  that  their  investors  are  better  protected  against  expropriation  and  increase  the 
willingness of investors to provide funds which then lowers the cost of capital. If reducing the cost of 
capital is the main motive for a cross-listing in the US, one would expect equity offerings following the 
cross-listing. Reese and Weisbach (2002) report that listed companies from French civil law countries 
(which are believed to have lower investor protection) have relatively more cross-listings in the US 
(10.52%)  than  companies  from  English  common  law  countries  (6.66%).  This  pattern  supports  the 
bonding hypothesis. Reese and Weisbach also find that while French legal origin firms opt for the more 
stringent governance rules of the US (which ensure better investor protection), English legal origin firms 
are more concerned with expanding their shareholder base and increase their visibility and the liquidity 
of their shares. They proceed by investigating the relationship between the company’s home country 
legal origin and the number of equity offerings following the cross-listing. They find evidence supporting 
the bonding hypothesis as firms from civil law countries are more likely to issue equity outside the US 
whereas firms from common law countries are more likely to issue their equity in the US.  
                                                 
16 These are shares which allow foreign companies to be directly listed on a US stock exchange. DaimlerChrysler  was the first 
company to issue such shares (Harris et al., 2004)   18 
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Doidge (2004) examines whether cross-listed companies have lower voting premiums (as measured by 
the ratio of the price of the voting right to the cash flow right). Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, 
he  finds  that  firms  cross-listed  on  a  US  stock  exchange  through  Level  II  or  Level  III  ADRs  have 
significantly lower voting premiums than firms without a cross-listing. However, firms that cross-list via 
Level I ADRs or Rule 144a ADRs do not have lower voting premiums. There is a negative relationship 
between the average change in the voting premium and the investor protection of a firm’s home country.  
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) examine the valuation effect resulting from a cross-listing in the US. 
They expect the cross-listing in the US to result in a reduction in the firm’s cost of capital for at least four 
reasons. First, the cross-listing increases the shareholder base. Therefore, a firm’s riskiness is shared 
more widely, which may lower the risk premium required by investors. Second, the cross-listing in the 
US increases the liquidity of the firm’s stock, which lowers the risk investors face when buying the stock 
and reduces their required rate of return. Third, the higher disclosure standards reduce the information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. This reduction may lower the chance of expropriation and 
thus the risk of investing, which results in a lower cost of capital. Finally, a US cross-listing leads to 
increased  scrutiny  and  monitoring  by  the  financial  press,  which  again  cuts  down  the  informational 
asymmetry and reduces the cost of capital. Doidge et al. argue that firms with large shareholders face a 
trade-off when cross-listing. On one hand, the reduction in the cost of capital increases the ability to 
finance the growth opportunities more easily. This results in increased future cash flows and a higher 
share value for the (controlling) shareholders. On the other hand, the increase in investor protection 
reduces the potential private benefits of control obtained by the large shareholders. Hence, from the 
perspective of the controlling shareholder, a cross-listing only makes sense if the increase in share value 
outweighs  the  loss  in  private  benefits  of  control.  Therefore  only  companies  that  face  high  growth 
opportunities will choose to cross-list in the US. Doidge et al. test this valuation effect using Tobin’s q. 
They find that the Tobin’s q for cross-listed firms is higher (by 16.5%) that for other companies from the 
same country. For companies from countries with low investor protection, there is a stronger positive 
relationship between the growth opportunities and the valuation effect of the company due to the cross-
listing. All in all, this paper supports the bonding hypothesis: companies with a strong need to attract 
external  capital  commit  themselves  to  better  corporate  governance  by  cross-listing  on  a  US  stock 
exchange.  
Rather than focusing on US cross-listings and the cross-listing premium, Abdallah and Goergen (2008) 
examine the choice of host market for a sample of 175 companies cross-listing on 19 different stock 
exchanges. There are at least three reasons why the firm’s ownership and control may influence the 
decision as to the location of the market for the cross-listing. First, a large shareholder faces a trade-off 
between the benefits from dispersed ownership which are risk diversification and liquidity and those   19 
from retaining control. A large shareholder will only be willing to give up control if the benefits from 
doing so outweigh her private benefits of control. If this is the case, the large shareholder may decide to 
cross-list her  firm  on  a  market  with  a higher  valuation  brought  about  by  better investor  protection. 
Second,  owners  of  high-risk  firms  will  prefer  to  cross-list  on  a  market  with  higher  diversification 
potential, which may be related to the degree of shareholder protection. Hence, owners of high-risk firms 
may decide to cross-list on a stock market with better investor rights. Finally, while the link between the 
choice of the host market and a firm’s control structure is not straightforward, Abdallah and Goergen 
expect there to be a link between the two. They also argue that some of the factors explaining the 
decision to cross-list – such as financing needs and financial constraints, share liquidity, and the bonding 
hypothesis – may also explain the choice of the cross-listing location.  
Their dependent variable is the improvement in investor protection brought about by the cross-listing. As 
hypothesized, they find that a firm’s control structure does indeed determine the cross-listing location as 
companies  with  concentrated  control  are  more  likely  to  cross-list  on  markets  with  better  investor 
protection. However, contrary to their expectations, the authors find that firms with substantial private 
benefits  of control  cross-list  on  markets  with  better  investor  protection. This relation  is  particularly 
pronounced for firms where control is concentrated in the hands of a single shareholder. In addition, 
firms with minority shareholders that are more likely to be expropriated by the controlling shareholder 
cross-list on better markets to bond themselves to protect the minority shareholders. Conversely, firms 
with several large shareholders are more likely to list on a market with low investor protection. In sum, 
Abdallah and Goergen find strong support for the bonding hypothesis. They also report that high-risk 
firms and firms with large financing needs and those suffering from illiquidity are more likely to cross-
list on markets offering better shareholder protection than their home markets.  
Lel and Miller (2006) argue that, after the cross-listing in the US, investors find it easier to dismiss the 
CEO when their firm’s performance is poor. Hence, there should be increased CEO turnover subsequent 
to the cross-listing. They find that this is indeed the case for cross-listed firms through Levels II and III 
ADRs, which is in line with the bonding hypothesis,  
Doidge et al. (2008) predict that opting for a better corporate governance system results in a share price 
increase.  However,  the  controlling  shareholder  loses  her  private  benefits  as  a  consequence  of  the 
increased disclosure and more stringent legal requirements. If the loss in private benefits outweighs the 
increase in the share price, it is unlikely that the controlling shareholder will choose to cross-list the 
company on a US stock exchange. Doidge et al. use two different proxies for private benefits of control. 
The  first  one  is  the  difference  between  the  control  rights  and  cash  flow  rights  held  by  the  largest 
blockholder (the control wedge measuring the potential loss of private benefits of control). The second 
one is the percentage of ultimate control rights held by the firm’s officers, directors, top-level managers, 
and  their  family  members.  They  find  that  the  control  rights  held  by  the  corporate  insiders  and  the 
difference between the control-rights and cash-flow rights held by the controlling blockholder reduce the 
probability of a US cross-listing.   20 
To summarise, the empirical literature provides strong support for the bonding hypothesis. Firms based 
in countries with weak shareholder rights choose to cross-list on markets with better investor protection 
to commit themselves not to expropriate their minority shareholders.  
However,  recent  changes  in  US  corporate  governance  regulation  have  changed  investors’  and 
academics’ view on the benefits from cross-listings. For example, Romano (2005) argues that the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is an ill-conceived piece of legislation that was adopted in a frantic political 
environment.  SOX’s  aim  was  to  restore  quickly  investor  confidence  after  the  Enron  debacle  by 
regulating corporate gatekeepers.
17 The law applies to all US public companies and to foreign companies 
cross-listed  in  the  US  via  Levels  II  or  III  ADRs  (Litvak,  2007a).  In  the  years  subsequent  to  the 
introduction  of  the  SOX,  a  large  number  of  firms  delisted.  For  instance,  during  2003  and  2004, 
approximately  300  US  companies  deregistered  their  common  stock  for  reasons  other  than  mergers, 
acquisitions, liquidations, registration withdrawals, or going-private transactions (Leuz, Triantis, and 
Wang, 2006). A listing on a stock exchange brings about substantial direct and indirect costs. According 
to Marosi and Massoud (2007), a major factor leading companies to delist or go dark during 2002-2004 
were the compliance costs of SOX which have significantly increased the direct and indirect listing 
costs. The indirect costs are caused by the enhanced accountability of corporate executives and boards in 
producing  and  verifying  publicly  available information.  Direct  costs  are  generated  by  the increased 
responsibilities of the auditors under SOX and the resulting increase in audit costs and fees paid by the 
firms.  
Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2006) confirm the relation between the introduction of SOX and the number of 
delistings.  Foley  and  Lardner  (2007)  provide  further  evidence  based  on  a  survey  of  147  public 
companies.  Seventy  percent  of  the  interviewees  expressed  concern  regarding  the  increase  in 
administrative fees caused by SOX and other corporate governance reforms, and 82% complained that 
the reforms had been too strict. Moreover, Lew and Ramsay (2006) and Engel et al. (2007) argue that 
SOX has increased the attractiveness of going private (or dark), particularly for smaller companies for 
which compliance costs are a major concern. All these results suggest that going private is the optimal 
response for those firms whose SOX compliance costs exceed the increase in shareholder value arising 
from improved governance. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that, while the costs of SOX hit 
small firms the most, the SOX rules tend to improve the value of large companies. 
Smith (2005) investigates whether the number of delistings of foreign firms changed in response to SOX. 
Most of the firms that delist following the passage of SOX claim that the increased costs of maintaining a 
US listing combined with a low trading volume no longer make a dual listing attractive. The SOX 
compliance costs also help to explain the decline in business combinations between foreign firms and 
US-listed firms: foreign firms prefer to merge with firms that are not listed in the US in order to avoid 
                                                 
17 These gatekeepers are the lawyers, accountants, auditors, investment bankers, securities analysts, corporate directors and 
officers, stock exchanges, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
and a variety of other governmental and non-governmental bodies, organizations, and professions.   21 
SOX-related expenses. Litvak (2007a) finds similar evidence: she reports that the stock prices of foreign 
firms subject to SOX (Levels II and III ADRs) decreased significantly relative to cross-listed firms not 
subject to SOX and to firms with a cross-listing.
18 Furthermore, Litvak (2007a, b, 2008) finds that the 
impact of SOX on stock prices varies considerably across the affected foreign firms. Whereas well-
governed firms and firms from countries with good investor protection carry a larger part of the net 
burden, faster-growing companies with relatively large financing needs suffer smaller losses, especially 
if they are from countries with weak investor protection. The overall evidence suggests that SOX hurts 
the  most  the  more  profitable,  smaller,  and  riskier  firms  as  well  as  firms  from  countries  with  good 
shareholder protection, while helping high-growth firms from countries with weak protection. 
Smith (2005) finds a concave relationship between the SOX announcement returns and the La Porta et 
al. (1998) measures for home-market accounting standards and shareholder protection laws. The bonding 
hypothesis holds true for firms from countries with mid-level accounting standards and shareholder 
protection laws as the value of these firms increases significantly after the announcement of the SOX 
enactment. However, the SOX announcement returns are significantly negative for firms from countries 
with  high-level  accounting  standards.  This  negative  effect  supports the  avoidance  hypothesis  which 
states that firms with high quality corporate governance have little to gain from adopting even more 
stringent  standards.  Finally,  the  returns  for  firms  from  low-level  countries  are  positive  but  not 
significant. These results show that SOX can either be value-enhancing or value-destroying, depending 
on whether the net benefits from the improved disclosure and governance outweigh the compliance 
costs.  
Finally several other papers study the consequences of a delisting for the shareholders. For example, 
Marosi  and  Massoud  (2007)  and  Leuz,  Triantis,  and  Wang  (2006)  show  that  shareholders  suffer 
significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns upon the announcement of the deregistration.  
In  sum,  the  empirical  literature  provides  strong  support  for  the  bonding  hypothesis  as  firms  from 
countries with weak investor protection are reported to cross-list on markets with better laws to commit 
themselves not to expropriate their shareholders. Finally, there is evidence suggesting that, although the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act may have benefitted a minority of firms, it has also imposed significant costs, i.e. 
costs outweighing its benefits, on the majority of foreign firms cross-listing in the US. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The traditional view that each state or country is free to choose its law no longer applies in a world with 
an increased use of contractual corporate governance devices. Indeed, several contractual devices, the 
                                                 
18 While a number of recent studies (see Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007); Zingales (2007); Zhang (2007); Berger, Li, and 
Wong (2005); Smith (2006); Li (2007)) have attempted to examine the impact of SOX on the cross-listing premium, we focus 
mainly on Litvak (2007b and 2008). The reason is that, unlike the other studies measuring the long-term effects of SOX, 
Litvak’s work controls for contemporaneous events that may also affect the Tobin’s q’s of foreign companies.  The cross-listing 
premiums in her papers are defined and measured as the difference between the Tobin’s q of a cross-listed firm and the Tobin’s 
q of a firm without a cross-listing from the same country matched by the propensity to cross-list.   22 
main  ones  being  cross-listings,  (re)incorporations,  and  cross-border  acquisitions,  enable  firms  to  re-
design their corporate governance and to deviate from or even choose their national standards. The 
question that arises is whether firms are engaged in a race to the bottom or to the top.  
However, before attempting to answer this question let us first review the three main contractual devices 
that  enable  firms  to  adjust  their  governance.  First,  cross-listings  allow  firms  to  choose  the  stock 
exchange(s) on which they want to be listed and hence the listing rules (the standards of disclosure, 
accounting rules, code of conduct, and corporate law) they are subject to. This way, firms can opt for 
either a more stringent corporate governance regime or a more lax one. Second, firms can also change 
their corporate governance regime by becoming a target in a cross-border takeover. In other words, if the 
acquirer is based in a more shareholder-oriented regime, the target shareholders may end up being better 
protected.  Even  when  the  acquirer’s  corporate  governance  regime  is  less  shareholder-oriented  and 
provides less investor protection, the acquirer can still bond itself or bootstrap to the more stringent 
regulation of the target. Third, a (re)incorporation enables firms to opt directly into another corporate 
governance regime.  
 Let us return to the question whether contractual corporate governance induces a race to the bottom or a 
race to the top. In other words, do firms prefer corporate governance mechanisms that erode shareholder 
protection and reduce corporate value (the shareholder exploitation hypothesis) or do they prefer those 
mechanisms that are beneficial for investors (the bonding or cost avoidance hypothesis)? With regard to 
(re)incorporations  in  the  US,  there  is  clearly  not  a  race  to  the  bottom  as  the  states  with  the  most 
detrimental  corporate  governance  regulation  for  shareholders  are  not  successful  in  attracting 
(re)incorporations. Still, there is hardly a race to the top either as the majority of incorporations and most 
of the reincorporations take place in Delaware. In addition, Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) and Bebchuk et 
al. (2003) found that over the past decade Delaware (re)incorporations have not created value. For a state 
to be attractive to corporate managers, it has to permit the use of anti-takeover devices. Therefore, the 
trend in (re)incorporations is unlikely to start a race to the top. A recent regulatory change has made it 
possible  for  EU  firms  to  incorporate  (but  not  reincorporate)  in  any  EU  country.  However,  the 
increasingly  popular  choice  of  incorporating  in  the  UK  seems  to  be  mainly  triggered  by  the  lower 
incorporation costs.  
Conversely, with regard to cross-border acquisitions, there is a clear race to the top for the following two 
reasons. First, acquirers from corporate governance regimes offering better investor protection more 
frequently take over targets with weak shareholder-orientation. Second, if the target is based in a better 
corporate  governance  regime,  the  evidence  shows  that  acquirers  with  poorer  shareholder  protection 
voluntarily bootstrap or bond themselves to the more stringent level of corporate governance regulation. 
Similarly, the evidence on cross-listings is in line with the race to the top argument as those firms that 
have  difficulty  raising  finance  and/or  have  a  high  potential  for  their  minority  shareholders  to  be 
expropriated by the large shareholder choose to cross-list on markets with better investor protection.   23 
Unfortunately, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seems to have resulted in constraining certain types of firms to 
opt into a better corporate governance regime. 
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 Table 1: Empirical research on cross-border M&As 
This table provides the recent research on the impact of corporate governance in cross-border M&As on premiums, returns, value, and takeover activity. As a proxy for the corporate governance 
quality the papers use the index of La Porta et al. (1998), except for the paper by Martinova and Renneboog (2007), which uses the corporate governance index score of Martinova and Renneboog 
(2006). CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return and BHAR for Buy and hold average return. CG stands for corporate governance. The column of corporate governance quality shows the relation 
between the dependent variable and the corporate governance quality of the target country: + indicates a significant positive result, - a significant negative one, n.s.s. is not statically significant and 
NA stands for non-available.  
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n.s.s.  No significant relationship between target CAR and the 
shareholder protection of acquiring company 












+  Significant positive relationship between CAR of acquirer 
and the quality of the corporate governance system of the 
acquirer country.  
153 
(153) 
NA  Takeover 
premium 
−  The takeover premium decreases in the quality of the 
bidder CG system. Targets acquired by bidders with weak 
CG systems require a higher risk premium. 
162  
(162) 
NA  CAR  
(target) 
−  Negative significant negative relation between the bidder 
CG system and the target CAR. Targets demand a high 







of US targets 
2,419  
(737) 
29  CAR 
(acquirer) 
n.s.s.  No significant relationship between the bidder CG quality 









65     
(65) 
NA  BAHR 
(acquirer) 
+  Positive significant relation between change in internal 
CG and BAHR. The improvement of CG through 



















n.s.s.  No significant relation between bidder’s CG quality and 
acquirer CAR. 






(7,233)  41  Tobin's q 
(target 
industry) 
+  Bidder’s CG is positively related to  Tobin’s Q of the 




Panel C. The difference in corporate governance quality between  bidder and target 














Main results  
Tobin's q 
(target ‘s 
industry)          
(+)  If a target is acquired by a bidder with better CG standards, the  
target's value increases 











industry)          
(+)  The acquired company loses in value, when acquiring a target 
with lower CG standards 









49  Nr of cross-
border deals  
(+)  The higher the difference between the quality of the CG systems 
of two countries, the higher the number of cross-border deals with 
the targets coming from the weakest CG system 
CAR  
(target) 
(+)  Significant positive relation between the difference in CG and the 
target CARs.  Targets with weak CG standards benefit from an 
















(−)  Negative relation between the difference in CG quality and the 
bidder CARs.  A bidder’s shareholder wealth increases when it 
acquires a target with lower CG quality 






(7,233)  41  Tobin's q 
(target ‘s 
industry) 
(+)  The larger the difference in CG quality, the higher the valuation 
effect for the target’s industry. This relationship is two–sided e.g. 
a positive difference yields a positive valuation effect and a 
negative difference gives a negative valuation effect  
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Table 2: US reincorporations and shareholder wealth 
This table provides an overview of the studies focusing on the shareholder wealth effect of US reincorporations. The table shows the sample period, the selection criteria, size of the event window, the subsamples, sample size, and 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs) measured before the reincorporation (ex ante), after the reincorporation (ex post), and over the total event window. The last two columns indicate whether the results are in line with the 
shareholder exploitation or cost avoidance hypotheses. (+) indicates that the results support the hypothesis, (-) indicates that the results refute the hypothesis, and n.s.s. stands for not statistically significant.  
CAARs  Hypotheses 
Study  Sample 
period 
Selection 
criteria  Event window  Sub sample  Sample 
size  Total event 









1977  NYSE listed firms 
[-2,0] 
(years)  Exclude co with highest CAR  139  +5.4%  -  +5.4%  n.s.s.  (-) 
All motives  150  4.10%  -0.40%  4.50%  n.s.s.  (-) 
Takeover-defence motive  43  1.30%  -0.60%  1.90%  n.s.s.  (-) 





NYSE or AMEX listed 




Tax and other motive  44  0.60%  -3.20%  3.80%  n.s.s.  (-) 
All motives  30  1%  +1.5%  -0.5%  n.s.s.  (-) 




US reincorpo-rations of 
NYSE listed firms 
[-30,+10] 
(days) 
No takeover-defence motive  16  +3.4%  +2.5%  +0.9%  (+)  (-) 
All  36  +5.7%  -  -  (+)  (-) 
>5% insider ownership  25  +6.4%  -  -  (+)  (-) 
≤5% insider ownership  11  +4.0%  -  -  (+)  (-) 










Not from California  17  +4.9%  -  -  (+)  (-) 
All  294  -0.1%  -0.1%  -  (-)  n.s.s. 
Takeover defence motive  54  -1.7%  -1.7%  -  (-)  (+) 
Takeover 
defence among motives  168  -0.8%  -0.8%  -  (-)  (+) 
Limited liability only motive  59  +2.0%  +2.0%  -  (+)  (-) 






NYSE, AMEX or OTC 
traded firms (excl. firms 
with share prices < $3, and 
firms traded less than 70% 
of sample period) 
[0,+5]       (days) 
Ltd liability nor takeover 
defences as motive  49  -1.2%  -1.2%  -  (-)  n.s.s. 
 Table 3: Value effects of a Delaware incorporation 
This table provides an overview of the studies on the impact of a Delaware incorporation on a firm’s value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) and on the 
likelihood of a takeover bid. The table shows the sample period and size, the dependent variable, and its relationship with a Delaware incorporation. 
The last two columns indicate whether the results are in line with the shareholder exploitation, or cost avoidance hypotheses. (+)indicates that the 
results support the hypothesis whereas (-) indicates that the results refute the theory. N.s.s stands for a not statistically significant relation. ***, **, * 
























of a hostile 
takeover bid 
0.35***  (+)  (-) 
24,470  Tobin’s q





of a hostile 
takeover bid 
0.461**  (+)  (-) 
24,434  Tobin’s q







of a hostile 
takeover bid 













  n.s.s.  n.s.s. 
 
 Table 4: Anti-takeover legislation and the US reincorporation decision  
This table provides an overview of the studies focusing on the relationship between a state’s anti-takeover legislation and (re)incorporations. The table shows the sample period, selection criteria, sample size , the dependent 
variable, and the relationship between this dependent variable with the quality of the anti-takeover defenses of the headquarters state, the current state of incorporation, and the most likely alternative state of incorporation. The last 
two columns indicate whether the results are in line with the shareholder exploitation or cost avoidance hypotheses. A (+) indicates that the results support that hypotheses whereas  a (-) indicates that the results refute the theory. 
 
 





size   Dependent variable  Quality of the anti-takeover defences is high in:   Hypotheses 












Incorporation in Delaware      (-)  (-)  (+) 
2000 
All US listed 
co’s (excl. 
financial co’s) 
5,768  Incorporation in some other 




2000  idem  5,598 
Probability of 
reincorporation in best 
alternative state of 
incorporation 
(+)  (-)    (-)  (+) 
5,323  Fraction of local firms 





2000  idem 
50  Log of (1+number of out-of-
state incorporation)  (+)      (-)  (+) 
   33 
 
Table 5: Cross-listings and the bonding hypothesis 
 
All the studies below measure corporate governance quality by La Porta et al.’s (1998) anti-director rights index. 
 
















48  Probability of a US 
cross-listing (ADR 
II or III) 
+  Firms from countries with strong corporate governance standards are 






454 (454)  48  Equity issues after 
a cross-listing 
(ADR II or III) 
−  Firms from countries with weak corporate governance standards do 
more equity issues outside the US subsequent to Level II and III 
ADR cross-listings 




20  Voting premium 
(ratio of price of 
voting right to cash 
flow right) 
−  Voting premiums are lower for firms cross-listing via Level II or III 
ADRs; the reduction in the voting premium  higher for firms from 
countries with weaker corporate governance standards 
Doidge et al. 
(2004) 
1997  778 (778)  40  Tobin’s Q  −  Firms from countries with weaker corporate governance standards 
have a higher cross-listing premium 




1318 (1318)  42  CEO turnover  −  Firms from countries with weak corporate governance standards 
observe higher CEO turnover after cross-listing 




4516 (398)  31  Probability of a US 
cross-listing (Level 
II or III ADR) 
−  Probability of a US cross-listing decreases with the stake held by 
corporate insiders and the difference in control rights and cash flow 













−  Firms from countries with weaker investor protection are more likely 
to cross-list on stock markets with significantly higher investor 
protection 
 
 